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Abstract
Wemodel consumption and labor supply behavior of a couple in a non-cooperative
setting. Using minimal assumptions, we prove that demand for public goods is
characterized by three regimes. It is either determined by the preferences of one of the
partners only (Husband Dictatorship or Wife Dictatorship), or by both spouses’
preferences, in which case each partner’s influence depends on the relative wage rates
(Split Might). The model is illustrated empirically using a sample drawn from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) where expenditures on children’s goods are a
public good in both spouses’ preferences. It turns out that the spending pattern
reflects the husband’s preferences in about 54% of the couples in our sample. Still, in
about 45% of the households, the wife acts as a dictator. Somewhat less than 1% of the
couples is characterized by a split might regime.
JEL-classification: D11; D12; D13.
Keywords: Consumption; Labor supply; Intra-household allocation; Non-cooperative
model; Public goods
1 Introduction
Common sense suggests that no two persons, and particularly not one man and one
woman, are alike. And although it can be argued that two persons who voluntarily form
a household will probably do so on the basis of shared interests and preferences (see, for
example, Becker 1973, 1981), no one will maintain that married individuals have identi-
cal preferences on all accounts. This means that (economic) decisions taken jointly in a
household will be more complicated than those taken by an individual.
One of the important insights from recent applied micro-econometrics is that multi-
person households indeed do not behave as single decision makers. Interestingly, early
attempts to explicitly account of the fact that multi-person households consist of different
individuals with own preferences, like Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1974), actually built
upon the idea that households behave as a single decision maker. In Samuelson (1956),
the household utility function results by consensus among the household members,
while Becker (1974) assumes some benevolent household head who takes into account
the preferences of the other household members when allocating time and resources to
the household members. The single decision maker assumption, which is fundamental
© Boone et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.
2014, 3:11
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/11
2014
Boone et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 2 of 19
to the standard unitary model of household behavior, is associated with the theoret-
ical implication that observed demand or labor supply should satisfy the well-known
Slutsky conditions. Slutsky symmetry and negativity, though, are usually rejected when
confronted with consumption or labor supply data (see, for example, Fortin and Lacroix
1997; Browning and Chiappori 1998; Cherchye and Vermeulen 2008; and Cherchye et al.
2009). The empirical evidence thus shows that differences in preferences among individ-
uals in multi-person households matter, implying that the nature of the (cooperative or
non-cooperative) household decision process cannot be ignored.
A number of alternatives to the unitary model have been put forward. One strand in the
literature assumes that household members only choose Pareto efficient allocations. This
is either formalized by means of axiomatic bargaining theory (see, for example, Manser
and Brown 1980; andMcElroy and Horney 1981) or via the so-called collective model (see
Chiappori 1988, 1992; and Apps and Rees 1988). Another strand of the literature assumes
that household members behave non-cooperatively or semi-cooperatively (see Leuthold
1968; and Ashworth and Ulph 1981, for seminal contributions and Browning 2000;
Browning et al. 2010; Lechene and Preston 2011; Cherchye et al. 2011; and d’Aspremont
and Dos Santos Ferreira 2014, for recent examples).
One of the main implications of the models that recognize that households do not
behave as single decision makers is that intra-household allocations may depend on
individual resources of household members rather than on only the household’s aggre-
gate means. A leading empirical example in this respect is that children seem to benefit
more when the mother (or grandmother) brings relatively more financial resources into
the household. This has been consistently shown for both developed and developing
countries (e.g. Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997, for the U.K., Thomas, Contreras and
Frankenberg 1997, for Indonesia, and Duflo 2003, for South Africa). From a policy point
of view this dependence on who brings what to the table is very important. It implies that
policy makers can alter the intra-household allocation of resources by targeting taxes or
transfers to specific household members.
The targeting issue has been investigated in a collective setting (see Blundell et al. 2005;
and Cherchye et al. 2012) as well as in a non-cooperative setting. The usual approach in
the latter is by consideringmodels that focus on the private provision of public goods (see,
among others, Bergstrom et al. 1986; Chen and Woolley 2001; and Lechene and Preston
2011). An important restriction in these existing non-cooperative models is that the indi-
vidual labor incomes, and thus the household’s resources, are assumed exogenous. It is
not difficult, however, to come up with arguments in favor of more realistic models that
not only explain the intra-household allocation of resources but also how these resources
are generated, allowing for the possibility that this is subject to strategic considerations.
A first aim of the current study is to fill this gap in our understanding by focusing on the
private provision of public goods while also taking into account labor supply decisions and
the implied endogenous individual incomes. We choose this non-cooperative setting not
only because of scientific curiosity but also because of its connection with the cooperative
setting. As emphasized by Browning et al. (2010), p. 788, cooperative bargaining mod-
els often use the non-cooperative outcome as a threat point1. Therefore, it is important
to understand household behavior in the non-cooperative setting given its implications
on the intra-household allocation of resources in the cooperative setting. Moreover, in
the case of informational constraints (more specifically, spouses who do not know each
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others’ preferences well) or the impossibility to make binding and costlessly enforceable
agreements on the transfer of (in our case endogenous) resources, the non-cooperative
setting is a useful benchmark.
We will start out with a general model and investigate what can happen to the demand
for public goods in this set-up. We define three regimes and show that all Nash equilibria
fall in either of these regimes. In the first regime, the husband is dictator (denoted by HD).
More specifically, the household’s demand for public goods fully reflects the husband’s
preferences given the household’s total resources. The second regime is associated with
split might (SM): each spouse’s preferences are reflected in the household’s spending on
public goods. The extent to which this happens depends on the spouses’ relative wage
rates. In the third regime the wife is the dictator (WD).
Like in Browning et al. (2010), and contrary to Lundberg and Pollak (1993), the regimes
are determined ‘endogenously’ by the spouses’ relative wage rates. The main difference
between our results and those obtained by Browning et al. (2010) is that we do not have a
pure local income pooling phenomenon. This is due to the endogenous individual labor
incomes in our model, which rule out exogenous shifts in individual income sources that
keep the household’s aggregate budget fixed. Still, there is some sort of local income pool-
ing in both dictatorship regimes: total household spending on public goods is as the most
powerful spouse would want it to be.
A second contribution of the current study is that the theoretical model for the pri-
vate provision of public goods with endogenous labor supply will be brought to the data.
Contrary to collective models, of which a wide variety of empirical applications are avail-
able, empirical evidence for the private provision of public goods remains scarce. This
gap will be partly filled in our paper by means of an empirical model that focuses on
expenditures on children’s goods (such as children’s clothing, toys or tuition fees). These
child related goods are considered to be public goods inside the household. The empiri-
cal model imposes more structure on the general model, leading to testable implications
of this model against the standard unitary model. The data for the application are drawn
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
of the U.S. Department of Labor. We find that the spouses’ preferences with respect to the
allocation of the couple’s resources differ from each other. Using the estimated preference
parameters, we can divide households into dictatorship and split might regimes. We find
that in the majority of the couples in our sample (about 54%), there is a Husband Dicta-
torship regime, in the sense that the spending pattern on public goods is based upon the
husband’s preferences. In about 45% of the couples, there is a Wife Dictatorship. In only a
small fraction, there is a Split Might regime. This implies that the regimes are determined
endogenously, rather than that they reflect traditional gender roles as in Lundberg and
Pollak (1993).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose a general private
provision of public goods model with endogenous labor supply and discuss its implica-
tions. Section 3 focuses on the empirical specification and the estimation strategy. The
data and estimation results are discussed in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Themodel
We focus on couples of different sex and let f denote the wife and m the husband2.
Spouses have to decide on their demands for leisure l f , lm ∈ [0, 1] (normalized between
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zero and one), including the option to be out of the labor market (l f = 1 or lm = 1) and
on how the household’s aggregate resources are allocated to private goods consumed by
the two spouses
(
denoted by vectors q f ∈ Rnf+ ,qm ∈ Rnm+
)
and public goods inside the
household
(
denoted by the vector Q ∈ Rnp+
)
. The household’s aggregate resources are
assumed to be equal to the sum of the individual labor incomeswf
(
1 − l f )+wm (1 − lm),
where wi is individual i’s (potential) wage rate (i = f ,m). This implies that, for simplicity,
we ignore non-labor income3. Prices of private and public goods are denoted by p and P,
respectively (where, with a slight abuse of notation, we use the same notation p for both
private good vectors).
In what follows, we assume that leisure is a private good in the sense that it does not
entail intra-household externalities. The wife’s and husband’s utility functions, represent-
ing their own preferences, are therefore given by:
u f
(
l f ,q f ,Q
)
(1)
and
um
(
lm,qm,Q) .
The main issue is how household decisions are made. Following, among others, Browning
et al. (2010), we assume a non-cooperative setting and assume a Nash equilibrium is
attained. A Nash equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1. A Nash equilibrium consists of individual leisure, a vector of individual
private consumption and individual contributions to public goods
(
li∗,qi∗,Qi∗) , i = f ,m,
such that for each i,
(
li∗,qi∗,Qi∗) solves for i = j:
max
li∈ [0,1],qi,Qi≥0
ui
(
li,qi,Qi +Q j∗) (2)
s.t. wili + p′qi + P′Qi = wi.
We denote marginal utility with respect to good x by ux and assume that this derivative
is well defined. We make the following assumptions on the utility functions (deleting
superscripts to ease notation if a condition holds for both partners):
Assumption For arbitrary values of l,q,Q we have that
1. limx↓0 ux(l,q,Q) = +∞ for leisure (x = l), each private good (x = qk) and each
public good (x = Qk),
2. limx→+∞ ux(l,q,Q) = 0 for each private good (x = qk) and each public good
(x = Qk),
3. ul(1,q,Q) < +∞,
4. u(l,q,Q) is concave in leisure, each private good and each public good and
5. there exist (at least) two public goods Qk ,Qk′ such that
u fQk
u fQk′
>
umQk
umQk′
.
The first four assumptions are fairly standard. Assumption 1 says that for each good the
marginal utility goes to infinity as the consumed amount of the good goes to zero. The
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second assumption says that for each private and public good the marginal utility goes
to zero as the amount of the good goes to infinity. These assumptions are made for ease
of exposition. We are interested in corner solutions where one of the partners does not
contribute to a public good, but we want to avoid corner solutions in private goods (other
than leisure) and total contributions to public goods4.
The third assumption implies that ul is finite if the partner does not work at all (l = 1).
The combination of assumptions 1 and 3 seems to imply that both partners participate in
the labor market, as one obtains infinite utility from consuming some private goods and
as labor income is the only resource available to pay for these private goods. It is, however,
still possible to capture non-participation (of either partner) in the labor market: If all
goods are public and there are no private goods other than leisure (as in the empirical
application; see Section 3) non-participation arises for a range of positive wage rates5.
Assumption 4 imposes concavity, which is sufficient to guarantee that stationary points
characterize a global maximum. Assumption 5 is the most interesting one in our con-
text since it implies a conflict within the household: there is a tension between the two
partners since they never agree on the overall contributions to the public goods.
Under assumptions 1–5, we can prove the following lemma. The Appendix contains the
proof.
Lemma 1. In Nash equilibrium6 we have for both partners that
ul
uqk
= wpk
for each private good qk.
We will now define three regimes and show below that all Nash equilibria fall in either
of these regimes. In the first regime, the husband is the dictator (denoted by HD). More
specifically, the household’s demand for public goods fully reflects the husband’s prefer-
ences given the household’s aggregate resources. The second regime is associated with
split might (SM): each spouse contributes to the public good(s) but not to all of them, and,
moreover, has a say on how the household’s total resources are allocated. The resulting
allocation, however, does not reflect the preferences of either spouse. In the third regime,
the wife is the dictator (WD). Like in Browning et al. (2010), and contrary to Lundberg
and Pollak (1993), which regime characterizes the equilibrium outcome is determined
within the model, and depends on the spouses’ relative wage rates. A special case within
the SM regime is the Separate Spheres regime of these two studies, where each spouse
contributes to strictly different sets of public goods. See Section 3 for a clarifying example.
Formally, we have the following (where we use the convention on inequalities with
vectors that x < y implies that xk ≤ yk for all k with strict inequality for at least one k).
Definition 2. The three regimes are defined as follows
HD umQm = λmP and u fQ f < λf P,
SM umQm < λmP and u
f
Q f < λ
f P and
WD umQm < λmP and u
f
Q f = λf P.
2014, 3:11
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/11
Boone et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 6 of 19
where λi = uiqk/pk (from Lemma 1) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with partner i’s
budget constraint (i = f ,m).
The following proposition demonstrates that the three regimes above are the only ones
that can occur in equilibrium. The proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. If wm > 0 and/or w f > 0, then HD, SM and WD are the only possi-
bilities. That is, each Nash equilibrium (satisfying (2)) is characterized by the equalities in
Lemma 1 and the conditions in either HD, SM or WD.
In the example of Browning et al. (2010) the regimes are ordered as HD, (our) SM
and WD, and the ordering is a function of the wife’s share of household income (which
is assumed exogenous in their setting). We present a similar result, with endogenous
incomes, for the specific case in the next section. Here we consider what we can say about
the ordering in our general set-up. Proposition 2 (partially) characterizes the ordering of
the three regimes in terms of relative (potential) wage rates ρ = wf/wm. See the Appendix
for a proof.
Proposition 2. There exist critical values ρ0 > 0 and ρ1 > ρ0 such that the household
is in regime HD for each w f/wm < ρ0 and in regime WD for each w f/wm > ρ1.
Our empirical specification in the next section imposes more structure on the utility
functions um and u f . This allows us to show that for given wm > 0 we move through the
regimes as wf increases in the order HD, SM and finally WD. With the general set-up
in this section we cannot rule out an ordering like HD, SM, HD (again), WD. Still, it is
both surprising and insightful that we can prove a result like Proposition 2 given the few
assumptions that we have made.
The robust insight is that when one partner (potentially) has a sufficiently higher wage
rate compared to that of the other partner, the household allocation to public goods
is determined completely by this partner’s preferences - given the household’s aggre-
gate resources. That is, one always starts with HD (for low ρ and a wife who does not
participate to the labor market) and ends up with WD (for high ρ and a working wife).
3 Empirical specification and estimation strategy
3.1 Empirical specification
We will illustrate the existence of dictatorship and split might regimes by means of a
sample of couples with children drawn from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).
This data set not only contains detailed purchases of each household but also information
on wages and labor supply of each household member (see the next subsection for more
details). Given the limitations of the particular data at hand, we will focus on a special case
of the general model described above. The three possible regimes continue to be Husband
Dictatorship, Split Might and Wife Dictatorship, as in the general set up described in
the previous section. But we make several simplifications. First, it turns out that almost
all prime age men in the selected sample work full time. We will therefore assume that
men’s labor supply is exogenously fixed. Wives, on the contrary, are assumed to be able
to choose any number of working hours they want, including non-participation. Wives’
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leisure is the only private good in the model. Second, as is common in budget surveys,
expenditures are recorded at the household level. This implies that, for most goods, each
spouse’s individual consumption of private goods is not observed. We will therefore make
the simplifying assumption that all consumption in the household is public. Two public
goods will be distinguished: a composite good that relates to expenditures on children’s
goods (such as clothing, toys and tuition fees) and a composite good relating to other
nondurable expenditures.
To obtain a tractable empirical specification, we will assume that spouses have prefer-
ences that can be represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions. The utility functions of
husband and wife are specified as follows:
um = β lnQ1 + (1 − β) lnQ2 (3)
u f = ω ln l f + (1 − ω)(α lnQ1 + (1 − α) lnQ2), (4)
where Q1 and Q2 are the composite goods related to non-children’s and children’s goods,
respectively, and l f is the wife’s leisure. Let us denote the respective prices of the two
public goods by P1 and P2. The spouse-specific preference parameters α, β and ω are
assumed to be between zero and one.
We will not make any assumption on the spouses’ relative valuation of the public goods,
but let the data speak instead. In other words, we will not impose that, say, the wife values
the child related public good more than the husband. Therefore, two cases can be dis-
tinguished: if β > α the husband values the child related public good less than the wife,
while the reverse holds if β < α. (The case β = α does not satisfy Assumption 5.)
Let us first focus on the scenario β > α. As shown below in detail, this model is
associated with three regimes, like the general model in Section 2. The first regime is char-
acterized by dictatorship of the husband, which implies that the household’s aggregate
resources are entirely allocated according to the husband’s preferences. Importantly, this
regime is associated with two subregimes: a subregime where the wife does not partici-
pate in the labor market and a subregime where the wife participates (but the husband is
still the dictator). The second regime is associated with split might. Given the assumption
that β > α, the child related public good is in this case entirely financed by the wife, while
the other public good is entirely financed by the husband. This situation corresponds to
the Separate Spheres case in Browning et al. (2010). In the third regime, the wife is the
dictator: the household’s aggregate resources are allocated to the two public goods accord-
ing to the wife’s preferences. In which of the three regimes a couple will be located
depends on the wife’s and the husband’s wage rates and on both spouses’ preference
parameters. Below we more formally characterize the three regimes:
Husband dictator First, for when the wife’s wage wf is rather small (to be made precise
below), the husband dictates the entire allocation over Q1 and Q2:
Q1 = βyP1
Q2 = (1 − β)yP2 ,
(5)
where
y = wm +
(
1 − l f
)
wf . (6)
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The wife’s labor supply decision in this situation is derived as follows:
max
l f
ω ln l f +(1−ω)
(
α ln
(
β
P1
)
+ (1 − α) ln
(
(1 − β)
P2
)
+ ln
(
wm +
(
1 − l f
)
wf
))
.
The first order condition for l f can be written as
l f w f
y =
ω
1 − ω .
Solving for l f , we get
l f = ω
(
1 + w
m
wf
)
. (7)
Taking account of the fact that l f ≤ 1, the wife will not participate (i.e., l f = 1) if
wf ≤ wm ω1 − ω .
In this case we have from (5):
Q1 = βw
m
P1
Q2 = (1 − β)w
m
P2
.
Next consider the case where wf ∈
[
wm ω1−ω ,wm
1−β(1−ω)
β(1−ω)
]
. The household’s aggregate
resources are now given by
y = (1 − ω)
(
wf + wm
)
. (8)
In this case, the husband stays the dictator and the demand functions for public goods
are
Q1 = β(1 − ω)
(
wf + wm)
P1
Q2 = (1 − β)(1 − ω)
(
wf + wm)
P2
.
(9)
The wife spends her entire income on Q2, so that the husband’s contribution to Q2 is
given by
Qm2 =
(1 − β)(1 − ω) (wf + wm)− wf (1 − l f )
P2
= w
m − β(1 − ω) (wm + wf )
P2
(10)
This phase stops once Qm2 = 0 which happens when wf ≥ wm 1−β(1−ω)β(1−ω) .
Split might Assume that wf ∈
[
wm 1−β(1−ω)
β(1−ω) ,wm
1−α(1−ω)
α(1−ω)
]
. This is the situation in
which Qm2 = 0 and Qf1 = 0. Now we have
Q1 = Qm1 =
wm
P1
Q2 = Qf2 =
(1 − ω)wf − ωwm
P2
.
(11)
This will last until
Q2
Q1
= 1 − α
α
P1
P2
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or, equivalently, until the wife’s wage has risen to
wf = wm 1 − α(1 − ω)
α(1 − ω) . (12)
Wife dictator For wf ≥ wm 1−α(1−ω)
α(1−ω) , the allocation of the household’s aggregate
resources is entirely determined by the wife’s preferences:
Q1 = α(1 − ω)
(
wf + wm)
P1
Q2 = (1 − α)(1 − ω)
(
wf + wm)
P2
.
(13)
The above characterization of the three regimes applies when β > α, i.e., when the
wife values the child related public good relatively more than the husband. Figure 1 sum-
marizes what happens in this situation as a function of wf , for given values of wm, α, β
and ω.
A similar characterization can be derived for the situation when β ≤ α (i.e., when the
husband values the child related goodmore than the wife). The complete characterization
of the different regimes for both situations are summarized as follows:
Situation 1: β > α
l f =
⎧⎨⎩ 1 if w
f ≤ ω1−ωwm
ω
(
1 + wmwf
)
if wf > ω1−ωwm
Q1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
βwm
P1 if w
f ≤ ω1−ωwm
β(1−ω)
(
wf +wm
)
P1 if w
f ∈
[
wm ω1−ω ,wm
1−β(1−ω)
β(1−ω)
]
wm
P1 if w
f ∈
[
wm 1−β(1−ω)
β(1−ω) ,wm
1−α(1−ω)
α(1−ω)
]
α(1−ω)
(
wf +wm
)
P1 if w
f > wm 1−α(1−ω)
α(1−ω)
(14)
Figure 1 The kinky nature of demand for public goods when β > α. As wf increases, demand moves
along the thick line. (Here wm = 55.000,α = 0.887,β = 0.932 and w = 0.191).
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Q2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1−β)wm
P2 if w
f ≤ ω1−ωwm
(1−β)(1−ω)
(
wf +wm
)
P2 if w
f ∈
[
wm ω1−ω ,wm
1−β(1−ω)
β(1−ω)
]
(1−ω)wf −ωwm
P2 if w
f ∈
[
wm 1−β(1−ω)
β(1−ω) ,wm
1−α(1−ω)
α(1−ω)
]
(1−α)(1−ω)
(
wf +wm
)
P2 if w
f > wm 1−α(1−ω)
α(1−ω) .
Situation 2: β < α
l f =
{
1 if wf ≤ ω1−ωwm
ω
(
1 + wmwf
)
if wf > ω1−ωwm
Q1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
βwm
P1 if w
f ≤ ω1−ωwm
β(1−ω)
(
wf +wm
)
P1 if w
f ∈
[
wm ω1−ω ,wm
1−(1−β)(1−ω)
(1−β)(1−ω)
]
(1−ω)wf −ωwm
P1 if w
f ∈
[
wm 1−(1−β)(1−ω)
(1−β)(1−ω) ,wm
1−(1−α)(1−ω)
(1−α)(1−ω)
]
α(1−ω)
(
wf +wm
)
P1 if w
f > wm 1−(1−α)(1−ω)
(1−α)(1−ω)
(15)
Q2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1−β)wm
P2 if w
f ≤ ω1−ωwm
(1−β)(1−ω)
(
wf +wm
)
P2 if w
f ∈
[
wm ω1−ω ,wm
1−(1−β)(1−ω)
(1−β)(1−ω)
]
wm
P2 if w
f ∈
[
wm 1−(1−β)(1−ω)
(1−β)(1−ω) ,wm
1−(1−α)(1−ω)
(1−α)(1−ω)
]
(1−α)(1−ω)
(
wf +wm
)
P2 if w
f > wm 1−(1−α)(1−ω)
(1−α)(1−ω) .
In both cases, the result is more specific than in Proposition 2. For a low ratio wf/wm,
the husband is the dictator (HD), and for a high ratiowf/wm, the wife is the dictator (WD).
In this special case, however, we have an unambiguous ordering and two thresholds, such
that we have HD below the lower threshold, WD above the upper threshold, and split
might (SM) for all wage ratios between the two thresholds. As a final remark, note that
when the husband is the dictator, then the wife can or cannot participate to the labor
market. This will depend on the (potential) wage ratio: for a relatively low wage ratio, she
will not work, while she will work if the wage ratio is higher than some threshold (see
equation 7). In the split might regime, she will always work. The same applies to the case
where she is the dictator.
3.2 Estimation strategy
As is clear from above, the household demand system for female leisure and both public
goods has a kinked nature. Figure 1 highlights this. Moreover, the kinks are determined
endogenously since they depend on the spouses’ preference parameters and relative
wage rates. We will specify an econometric model accounting for the endogenous kinks
that can be estimated with maximum likelihood. This model is similar to traditional
econometric models with unobserved and endogenous regimes such as Goldfeld and
Quandt (1975).
Obviously, female labor supply choices and the allocation of resources to children can
be expected to depend on the number of children and their age structure. To account
for this observed heterogeneity across the households in the data, we let the preference
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parameters α, β and ω depend on a series of variables that capture the age structure of the
children in the household7. We use dummy variables capturing the following categories:
(1) all the children in the household are less than 6 years old; (2) the oldest child is between
6 and 11, and there is at least one child less than 6; (3) all children are between 6 and 11;
(4) the oldest child is between 12 and 17, and at least one child is less than 12; (5) all
children are between 12 and 17; and (6) the oldest child is older than 17, and at least
one child is younger than 17. The reference category is the category for which all the
children are younger than 6. The other five categories are associated with the respective
dummy variables c1, . . . , c5. Moreover, to impose that the parameters α, β and ω are
always between 0 and 1 so that the Cobb-Douglas utility functions are well-behaved, we
specify them through the following functions:
α = exp (α0 + α1c1 + . . . + α5c5) / (1 + exp (α0 + α1c1 + . . . + α5c5))
β = exp (β0 + β1c1 + . . . + β5c5) / (1 + exp (β0 + β1c1 + . . . + β5c5))
ω = exp (ω0 + ω1c1 + . . . + ω5c5) / (1 + exp (ω0 + ω1c1 + . . . + ω5c5)) .
(16)
It is easily seen that in each (sub)regime within the situations (14) and (15), adding up is
satisfied: the sum of expenditures on the two composite public goods and female leisure
always equals the household’s full budget (i.e., wf l f +P′Q = wf +wm). This implies that,
as in standard demand analysis, one of the goods in the three-good demand system may
be left out. We chose to model the household’s demand for both public goods, so that the
wife’s leisure is omitted.
To estimate the model, we need to be explicit about the error terms. Optimization
errors in the demand equations are introduced, translating into good-specific additive
error terms. We assume that these errors are uncorrelated across households but poten-
tially correlated across goods within a given household. Let Qi1 and Qi2 denote couple i’s
demand for the composite non-children’s public good and the child related public good
respectively, and let xi =
(
wfi ,wmi ,Pi1,Pi2, nc, a f
)′
denote the vector of exogenous vari-
ables in our model. Observed demands are assumed to be equal to f r,s1 (xi) + i1 and
f r,s2 (xi)+i2, where f r,1k (for goods k =1,2 and regions r = 1, 2, 3, 4) correspond to the left-
hand sides of equations (14) and f r,2k to those in (15). We assume that the vector of error
terms is independent of x and is drawn from the following bivariate normal distribution:(
i1
i2
)
∼ N2
[(
0
0
)
,
(
σ 21 ρσ1σ2
ρσ1σ2 σ
2
2
)]
,
where the standard deviations σk (k = 1, 2) and the correlation between i1 and i2,
denoted by ρ, need to be estimated.
This completes the specification of the model. Since we have completely specified the
distribution of the error terms given the regressors, themodel can be estimated withmax-
imum likelihood. To derive expressions for the likelihood contributions of all households,
we introduce two times four couple-specific dummy variables dr,1i and d
r,2
i (r = 1, . . . , 4)
that indicate the (sub)regime in which a couple operates, on the basis of the preference
parameters of both spouses and their wage rates. The first four dummy variables dr,1i
(r = 1, . . . , 4) refer to the situation where βi > αi (the wife values the child related public
good more than the husband), while the other four dummy variables dr,2i (r = 1, . . . , 4)
refer to the alternative situation where βi < αi. In each situation, the four dummy vari-
ables indicate the (sub)regime in which a couple operates. Recall that the regime in which
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the husband is a dictator is associated with two subregimes: one where the wife is not
working and another one where the wife is working. Depending on the situation and the
(sub)regime, household specific demand equations apply; see equations (14) and (15).
Given the above assumptions, the likelihood contribution of couple i is equal to:
gi (Qi1,Qi2|xi) =
4∑
r=1
dr,1i
⎧⎨⎩ 12πσ1σ2√1 − ρ2 exp
⎡⎣− 1
2
(
1 − ρ2)
(
Qi1 − f r,11 (xi)
σ1
)2
+
(
Qi2 − f r,12 (xi)
σ2
)2
− 2ρQi1 − f
r,1
1 (xi)
σ1
Qi2 − f r,12 (xi)
σ2
⎤⎦⎫⎬⎭
+
4∑
r=1
dr,2i
⎧⎨⎩ 12πσ1σ2√1 − ρ2 exp
⎡⎣− 1
2
(
1 − ρ2)
(
Qi1 − f r,21 (xi)
σ1
)2
+
(
Qi2 − f r,22 (xi)
σ2
)2
− 2ρQi1 − f
r,2
1 (xi)
σ1
Qi2 − f r,22 (xi)
σ2
⎤⎦⎫⎬⎭ .
Combining all n households, we obtain the following sample loglikelihood function:
ln L =
n∑
i=1
ln gi (Qi1,Qi2|xi) .
Maximizing this loglikelihood function leads to the estimates α̂j, β̂j, ω̂j
(
j = 0, 1, 2), σ̂k
(k = 1, 2) and ρ̂. On the basis of these estimates, each spouse’s relative preferences for the
child related public good vis-a-vis the composite non-children good and (for women) for
leisure can be estimated, as well as the (sub)regime in which each couple operates.
4 Data
For the empirical analysis in this paper we have used the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX) collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor. Like
most authors in the consumption literature that use the CEX (e.g., Deaton and Paxson
1994; Attanasio andWeber 1995; and Attanasio and Davis 1996) we have compiled a data
set from the quarterly Interview Survey (IS) that collects data through a recall question-
naire rather than from the biweekly Diary Survey (DS) that collects data through a daily
purchase questionnaire8. This was done for three reasons. First, the IS contains more
observations. Second, the IS was especially designed to collect data on major expenditure
items. The most substantial elements of child expenditures, such as tuition fees, classify
as such. Third, the expenditure component directly related to children is larger - both in
terms of absolute and relative value - in the IS than in the DS.
The CEX data set contains household observations from 1998 until 2007. The IS has
a rotating panel setup in which a household is interviewed at maximum four times in
one year. We aggregate all family expenditures to the annual level so that we can link the
consumption information to the (yearly) income information. In the event that a family
was observed only two or three times within one year, we multiplied observed consump-
tion with the appropriate factor. The waves we use contain 104,049 unique household
observations in total.
We construct a sample that is best suited for our structural approach. It includes obser-
vations of all married couples with one, two or three children (of which at least one
of these is less than 17 years old), with spouses aged between 25 and 60, in which the
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husband works at least 25 hours a week for at least 40 weeks a year, and in which neither
of the spouses is enrolled in college or university nor is self-employed. Families with one
or both spouses currently attending college or university are excluded because we want to
be sure that tuition expenditures can be classified as expenditures for the children. Delet-
ing households with underemployed or unemployed men greatly simplifies the empirical
model and the estimation procedure, whereas it leads to a loss of only seven percent
of observations. Households that included other adults were also dropped. To make the
direct expenditures on children comparable on an absolute level, we differentiate between
the subsamples of families with one, two and three children. Finally, to get rid of outliers,
we dropped all households where the wage of one of the spouses or the expenditures on
children is below the 1st or above the 99th percentile. Because of all these constraints we
impose on the selection of the estimation sample, our sample is considerably smaller than
the complete CEX sample: it contains 7,757 observations.
For the estimation of the structural model parameters we need four variables: l f , the
wife’s leisure;Q2, which contains an estimate of total yearly child expenditures per house-
hold; wm, the husband’s wage rate; and wf, which is the wife’s wage rate. Not all child
expenditures are separately observed in the CEX. As we do not knowwho consumes what,
it is unclear whether expenditures such as sweets or cinema tickets were intended for
children or for adults. For some categories it can however be ruled out that the goods
were intended for adults. These expenditure categories include school meals, infant furni-
ture, boys apparel, girls apparel, boys and girls footwear, infants apparel, toys, educational
books and supplies, and elementary school, high school and college tuition and fees.
We aggregate four quarterly expenditure data points to obtain an estimate of household
expenditures at the annual level.
Price information is also obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Seasonally
adjusted Urban Consumer Price Indices that were reported per calendarmonth have been
used. As we need a separate price index for children’s goods, we use a U.S. city average
by expenditure category and commodity and service group. This means that we do not
take regional price variation into account. We compute a monthly CPI for child expendi-
tures by averaging the available separate product CPIs and taking account of the weights
that these products have in the total expenditures on children goods. Separate CPIs were
available for all components of Q2, except for baby furniture and school meals. As the
quarterly IS interviews take place throughout all months of the year, our data set con-
tains 120 monthly values of Q2’s CPI. Because households report expenditures over the
previous three months, we assign the CPI that pertains to the third month prior to the
interview to the expenditures in a certain quarter. We take the average of these CPI’s to
obtain an annual price observation. Cumulative inflation on our basket of child related
goods has been 32.0 percent from January 1998 until January 2008, which amounts to a
yearly average inflation rate of 2.8 percent.
The CEX documents total yearly household net income as well as individuals’ gross
labor incomes. We have employed two alternative ways to estimate the husband’s net
labor income. If the household received no non-labor income we derived it as the per-
centage of household’s net income corresponding to his gross labor income share. If the
household did receive some non-labor income, we computed his net wage on the basis
of his gross wage using an estimated spline relation between gross and net income in the
households that did not receive any non-labor income.
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Potential female wage income is based on the same gross to net conversion as male
wage income. Moreover, the hourly wage rate is computed for all employed women but
imputed for all women that are unemployed or out of the labor force at the time of the
survey. To do the imputations, we estimated a Heckman selection model in which the
exclusion restriction is the number of children a women has – this affects selection into
paid employment but has no effect on the wage rate. The Heckman model controls for
the wife’s education level, age group, her state of residence, and for the year of the survey.
It is estimated using the total CEX data set, not only our estimation sample. The potential
female wage income is then computed by multiplying the (imputed) wage rate with the
average weekly number of hours worked by men times 52 (the number of weeks). The
female wage rate was imputed in 18.5%, 22.8% and 29.4% of the households in our samples
with one child, two children, and three children, respectively (the percentages of mothers
that did not participate in the labor market).
Table 1 displays summary statistics for the three subsamples. As expected, mean and
median expenditures on child related goods increase with the number of children. The
mean and median hourly wage rates are much higher for the husbands than for the wives
in our sample, and do not vary substantially with the number of children. For both wage
rates and for expenditures, the mean exceeds the median, in line with the usual finding
that these variables are right-skewed.
5 Estimation results
Let us now focus on the estimation results for couples with one, two and three children.
Preference parameter estimates were obtained by means of the estimation strategy out-
lined above. They are shown in Table 2. It is clear from the results that preferences over
child’s expenditures and the other expenditures of husbands and wives differ from each
other. This difference is reflected in most parameters and is most obvious for the param-
eters associated with the age composition of the children, which in almost all cases are
statistically significant and have a different sign for husbands (β) and wives (α). This
implies that spouses’ marginal propensities to spend on children and other goods move in
different directions if the family composition moves away from the benchmark (all chil-
dren younger than 6).We also ran a formal test of the joint null hypothesis that αi = βi for
i = 0, . . . , 5. The hypothesis that spouses have the same marginal propensities to spend
on children’s goods and other consumption is strongly rejected (p-value 0.000). Taken
together, this is strong evidence, both in statistical terms as well as in economic terms,
against the unitary model.
Table 1 Summary statistics (Estimation sample; 7,858 observations)
One child Two children Three children
Number of households 2716 3713 1328
Mean child expenditures $ 3896 $ 4303 $ 4281
Median child expenditures $ 2257 $ 2790 $ 2880
Mean hourly wage husband $ 23.42 $ 24.66 $ 24.30
Median hourly wage husband $ 19.57 $ 20.77 $ 20.06
Mean hourly wage wife $ 16.39 $ 16.41 $ 15.12
Median hourly wage wife $ 14.27 $ 13.91 $ 12.51
Wife in labor force 81.52% 77.16% 70.63%
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Table 2 Estimation results for couples
Parameter Estimate St. error
α0 4.445 0.288
α1 -1.560 0.293
α2 -1.199 0.295
α3 -1.219 0.293
α4 -1.077 0.294
α5 -0.663 0.145
β0 3.147 0.123
β1 0.316 0.165
β2 0.678 0.166
β3 0.362 0.149
β4 0.238 0.140
β5 -0.054 0.128
ω0 -1.254 0.030
ω1 0.001 0.046
ω2 -0.114 0.042
ω3 -0.090 0.056
ω4 -0.270 0.045
ω5 -0.089 0.060
σ1 0.146 0.003
σ2 0.044 0.001
ρ -0.129 0.015
Note: α1 − α5, β1 − β5 and ω1 − ω5 are the coefficients of the dummies for household composition; see Section 3.2.
The estimation results imply that spouses’ preferences with respect to the allocation
of the household’s expenditures differ from each other. Let us now have a look at the
implication of this on the couples’ location in the different regimes discussed in Section 2.
On the basis of the estimated preference parameters in Table 2, the expected numbers
of couples in each of the (sub)regimes can be calculated; they depend on the estimated
values of β vis-à-vis that of α (see equations (14) and (15)), as well as on the wage ratios.
The obtained number of households per (sub)regime and the associated proportions are
presented in Table 3.
A first conclusion that can be drawn from the results in Table 3 is that in the majority
of the households, the husband values the child’s expenditures less than the wife (i.e.,
β̂ > α̂ in about 52% of the couples). Secondly, the table demonstrates that the husband
is a dictator in the majority of the couples in our sample (more precisely, about 54%).
This implies that the spending pattern of these households is according to the husband’s
preferences. Recall from Section 3 that a husband dictatorship can be associated with
Table 3 Proportion of couples in the different regimes
̂β > α̂
Husband dictator 473 households 6.10%
Split might 64 households 0.83%
Wife dictator 3506 households 45.20%
β̂ ≤ α̂
Husband dictator 3714 households 47.88%
Split might 0 households 0%
Wife dictator 0 households 0%
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both a spouse who does not participate in the labor market and a working spouse. This
feature is also reflected in our results: in about 14% of the husband dictatorships, the
female does not work, while in the remaining couples the female works. In a sizeable set
of the couples (about 45%), the wife is a dictator who determines the spending pattern. A
split might regime applies to almost 1% of the households; in all of these households the
husband values the child’s expenditures less than the wife. Note that in wife dictatorships
and the split might regime, females are working as demonstrated in Section 3.
These results are in line with the message of Browning et al. (2010), who showed that
regimes are endogenous rather than that they reflect specialization inside the household,
which is driven by traditional gender roles as in Lundberg and Pollak (1993). Finally, it
is interesting to observe that a dictatorship regime (that is not gender-specific) occurs in
most households. Recall that the type of a given household in general depends on both
spouses’ preferences, their relative wages and the prices of the private and public goods.
Specific to our empirical model is that all household resources are spent on publicly con-
sumed goods. Moreover, the empirical results demonstrated that both spouses derive
utility from the consumption of these public goods. Given this, having a partner who acts
as a dictator is not necessarily very harmful for one’s utility (though, of course, utility
would be higher if she/he was the dictator herself/himself ). It is an open empirical ques-
tion whether similar results would be obtained for very different commodity bundles in
which there is more room for divergent spouses’ preferences. We leave this question for
future research.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we model the consumption and labor supply behavior of a couple in a
non-cooperative setting by adopting a Nash approach. Using minimal assumptions, we
prove that demand for public goods is defined by only three regimes. Either demand for
public goods is solely determined by the preferences of one of the partners (Husband
Dictatorship or Wife Dictatorship), or by the preferences of both spouses, who take into
account each other’s contributions to public goods (Split Might). The particular regime
that applies to a couple is shown to depend on the spouses’ relative wage rates. This
resembles the endogenous regimes that depend on exogenous individual incomes in
Browning et al. (2010).
By imposing more structure on the general model, we can derive testable implications
on observed demand for public goods and labor supply that allow testing the model
against the standard unitary model where a couple behaves as a single decision maker.
The model is then applied to a sample of couples drawn from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CEX) whereby we focus on expenditures on children’s goods as a public good.We
find that the standard unitary model is rejected in favor of our non-cooperative model,
in the sense that spouses’ preferences with respect to the allocation of the household
resources differ. Using the estimated preference parameters, we can divide households
into dictatorship and split might regimes. It turns out that the spending pattern reflects
the husband’s preferences in about 54% of the couples in our sample. Still, in about 45% of
the households, the wife acts as a dictator. Only a small fraction (about 1%) of the couples
is characterized by a split might regime. It seems rather striking that there is either a male
or a female dictator in about 99% of the couples. Part of the explanation can be found in
the fact that we assume that the household members only spend money on public goods
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that are appreciated by both spouses. Under this assumption, it is not necessarily too
harmful for one’ utility to have a partner who acts as a dictator.
Endnotes
1See Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Chen and Woolley (2001) for examples. In the
cooperative models of Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981), the
alternative threat point of divorce is used.
2It goes without saying that all theoretical results apply to same-sex couples as well.
For notational reasons we stick to the traditional husband and wife terminology.
3Our analysis does not substantially change if individual non-labor incomes are also
considered. The definition of the different regimes becomes more complicated though
as it depends on the sums of both labor and non-labor incomes, where the former are
endogenous (given that labor supply is driven by the wage rate, the individual non-labor
income and the prices of the private and public goods).
4Allowing for such corner solutions adds inequalities to the optimality conditions.
This complicates notation without adding insight. On the other hand, the corner
solutions for individual contributions to public goods are essential in the current context
since they characterize the nature of the equilibrium outcomes, as we show below.
5w = 0 would also imply that someone does not participate.
6It follows from Theorem 1.2 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 34) that a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium exists in our case. Multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out.
7Note that the number of children is assumed to be exogenously given, as is rather
standard in this type of empirical analyses. See Becker (1960) for an early economic
theory on fertility decisions.
8For a detailed comparison of the Interview Survey and the Diary Survey see Battistin
(2004).
Appendix: Proofs of results
Proof of Lemma 1
We define
dl = ε
dqk = −
w
pk
ε
u(ε) = u(l + dl,q+ dqkιk ,Q)
where ιk denotes a vector which equals 1 (one) at position k and is zero everywhere else.
Note that dl and dqk are defined in such a way that ε = 0 is feasible in terms of the budget
restriction.
It follows that
u′(ε) = ul − uqk
w
pk
. (17)
First, consider the case where w > 0. Then we prove by contradiction that the equality
in the lemma holds. Note that uluqk >
w
pk implies that utility increases with ε contradicting
equation (2). We need to be careful though as ε > 0 is not possible with l = 1. How-
ever at l = 1 we have qk = 0 (as there is no income to spend on private goods) and thus
uqk = +∞ (by assumption 3). Since ul is finite at l = 1 (by assumption 3), we cannot
have uluqk >
w
pk . Similarly, note that
ul
uqk
< wpk implies ε < 0 would raise utility again, con-
tradicting equation (2). It is not possible to have ε < 0 at l = 0. But due to assumption 3,
we cannot have uluqk <
w
pk at l = 0.
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Second, consider w = 0. Then we have l = 1, qk = 0. Due to assumptions 1 and 3, we
then have
ul
uqk
= 0 = wpk
and the equality in the lemma holds. 
Proof of proposition 1
The proposition implies that we need to rule out two cases. First, we need to rule out that
u jQk > λ
jPk for any partner j ∈ { f ,m} and any public good Qk . Second, we need to rule
out that uQ = λP for both partners.
Suppose (by contradiction) that u jQk > λ
jPk . If wm > 0, assumption 1 implies that the
husband will contribute to every public good if the wife does not contribute to that public
good. Similarly, if wf > 0, the wife will contribute to each public good if the husband
does not. In either case we haveQk > 0 for each public good k, and hence u jQk is finite for
both partners. Given the Nash assumption that Q(−j)∗k is given, partner j can raise utility
by increasing Qjk which contradicts equation (2).
Second, assume (by contradiction) that uQ = λP for both partners. This would imply
u fQk
u fQk′
= PkPk′ =
umQk
umQk′
for each pair of public goods Qk ,Qk′ . However, this contradicts assumption 5. 
Proof of proposition 2
Consider wm > 0 and wf = 0. Hence Q f = 0 as the wife earns no income. Given
assumption 3 it is optimal for the husband to contribute to each public good Qk . Hence
u fQk is finite for each public good Qk . Since w
f = 0 implies that q f = 0, we have
λf = +∞ so u fQ f < λf P. Moreover, the first order conditions for utility maximization
of the husband implied by the Nash equilibrium with Q f = 0 imply umQm = λmP. Hence,
indeed we are in regimeHD. By continuity this also holds forwf > 0 close enough to zero.
The proof of the existence of ρ1 is similar but then starting from wf > 0,wm = 0. This
gives us regimeWD. By continuity we are also in regimeWD for wm > 0 close enough to
zero. 
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